We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via upfront binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent on the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.
I. Introduction
The practice of vote buying appears in many societies and organizations, and in different forms. Obvious examples include direct payments to voters, donations to a legislator's campaign by special-interest groups, the buying of the voting shares of a stock, and the promise of specific programs or payments to voters conditional on the election of a candidate. Our purpose here is to explore the consequences of vote buying. The aim is both to enhance the understanding of those forms of vote buying that are widely practiced, such as making campaign promises, and to shed light on the hypothetical question of what might happen if vote buying were allowed where it is currently prohibited. The latter question can of course help us think about the rationale behind current social conventions. To do so we study how vote buying would function in an environment in which it is allowed and free of stigma.
We inquire how voters' preferences over outcomes and parties' valuations of winning affect the outcome of the election, how the institutional environment-whether parties can purchase votes with up-front payments or can only make campaign promises-affects the outcome, and how vote buying affects the efficiency of the outcome.
We address these questions using the following model. We initially focus on a complete-information environment but later allow for some incomplete information. There is a finite population of voters choosing between two competing parties. Each of the parties has a value for winning and is interested in obtaining a majority of the votes while spending as little as possible. We examine two scenarios: one in which the parties compete only in campaign promises (that are contingent on the outcome of the election but not on the actual vote) and the other in which parties compete in up-front vote buying (where the payment is contingent on the vote but not on the outcome). In both scenarios the parties make offers in a sequential and alternating bidding process.
The answers to the first two questions raised above are intertwined. The identity of the winning party and the distribution of payments to voters depend not just on voter preferences and party valuations, but also critically on whether up-front vote buying is permitted or only campaign promises are allowed. When parties compete only through campaign promises, the total payments received by voters tend to be substantially higher than under up-front vote buying. Moreover, when parties compete only through campaign promises, the voters whose preferences matter are a specific subset of the voters near the median voter.
Both these features are broadly consistent with the analysis of Anderson and Tollison (1990) , who claim that vote buying was widespread (though never fully legal) in Britain and the United States prior to the introduction of secret ballots toward the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.
1 They claim that when vote buying 1 We should emphasize that vote buying is not solely something of the past, but continues today. See, e.g., Callahan and McCargo (1996) for a study of such activity in elections in Thailand in 1995. occurred, the sums involved were quite small. Moreover, they argue that the elimination of vote buying contributed to the historical rise in government expenditures on social policies. The low payments with upfront vote buying also seem consistent with the observation that the price of stocks with voting rights is generally similar to that of nonvoting stocks (Lamont and Thaler 2003) . 2 The answer to the efficiency question is that with no vote buying, with campaign promises, or with up-front vote buying, the outcome could be Pareto efficient or inefficient. This independence of efficiency from the trading environment follows since in all three situations voters' preferences are not fully accounted for in determining the winner of the election.
There are several lines of related literature: the study of Colonel Blotto games (e.g., Laslier and Picard 2002) ; the political science literature on lobbying (e.g., Groseclose and Snyder 1996) , common agency (Bernheim and Whinston 1986), campaign promises (e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Myerson 1993) , and vote buying (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Anderson and Tollison 1990; Piketty 1994) ; and the finance literature on corporate control and takeover battles (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1988; Harris and Raviv 1988) . We also have a companion paper (Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky 2006b ) with a related but distinct model. Discussing how our conclusions relate to those in the literature will be easier after the presentation of our model and results, so we defer this discussion to Section V.F.
II. A Model of Vote Buying
Two "parties," X and Y, compete in an election with an odd number, N, of voters. We may think of the parties as candidates in the election or supporters of two alternatives. A party needs votes to m p (N ϩ 1)/2 win the election. Prior to the election the parties try to influence the voting by offering money payments to voters. Each voter i is characterized by parameters and that are interpreted as the utility she
obtains from a victory of X and Y, respectively. Let , and
label voters so that is nonincreasing in i. Under this labeling, we refer U i to voter m as the median voter and, without loss of generality, suppose that voter m is a supporter of party X ( ). There is a smallest money
, so offers can be made only in multiples of . To avoid dealing 1 0 with ties, it is assumed that is not an integer multiple of .
U i
2 The reason is that one can "buy" votes without buying shares in the firm by buying shares with voting rights and selling (short) shares without voting rights. Any difference in returns between the shares must arise from the ability to vote. Of course, in the case of the firm, one is purchasing the right to all future votes (not just one vote), so the small difference indicates an even smaller price per vote.
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The vote-buying games.-We consider two types of offers that parties can make to voters:
1. up-front payments: a binding agreement that gives the party full control of the vote in exchange for an up-front payment to the voter; 2. campaign promises: a promise that has to be honored by the party if it is elected; the voter maintains control of the vote.
3
The parties alternate in making offers. In the up-front buying game, party k announces in its turn an offer to buy up to m votes at price ; in the campaign promises game, party k announces campaign
These games share the following common features:
• A fresh price offer (or a promise) made to a voter cannot be lower than those previously made by the same party to the same voter.
• When a party moves, it observes all past offers and promises by each party to each voter.
• The bidding process ends when two consecutive offers (one by X and one by Y ) go by without any change in who would win if the game ended in those rounds.
• Once the bidding process ends, voters tender their votes to the parties, and the party that collects more than half the votes wins.
Voters are not modeled as players. In the description of each of the games below we make direct assumptions on how voters tender their votes given their preferences and the final bids they face.
Party k has a utility for winning, so party k's (net) payoff is the k W probability of k winning times less the total payments by k to voters. k W To avoid dealing with ties, it is assumed that is not an integer multiple
Thus, the parties' payoffs are modeled like payoffs to bidders in an auction. This corresponds to a view that control of the government is an economic asset and that political competition is a contest of profit maximizers to obtain this asset at minimal cost. This is a stark view of political competition. We elaborate on it in Section V.E., where we also contrast it with alternative views. As more fully discussed there, political competition of this sort does not necessarily imply that the government does not provide benefits. It is consistent with a government being constrained to provide no less than a benchmark level of benefits and to levy no more than a benchmark level of taxes. In the campaign promises scenario, promises are then made to individual voters to lower their tax rates and/or increase their benefits relative to those benchmark levels, with the winning party capturing any excess in the budget for itself. In the up-front payments scenario, the benchmark levels of taxes and benefits are unchanged by the vote-buying competition. Instead, voters may receive direct transfers before the election. For simplicity, we have normalized the minimum levels of taxes and benefits to be zero, without any effect on the analysis.
We focus on the complete-information version of the games in which the parties' and the voters' preferences are known to the parties when they bid. In order to identify robust conclusions, we also consider the case in which the parties' utilities are imperfectly known. Strategies for the parties are defined in the obvious way in each case. In the completeinformation game, we study a subgame-perfect equilibrium; we discuss the solution concept for the incomplete-information case when we apply it below.
III. Campaign Promises
We begin by studying the game in which only campaign promises are permitted. Here party k's net payoff is if k wins having made We assume that voter i will vote for X if and only if voters in order to secure the support of a minimal majority, in case X does not promise anything. Thus is one possible measure of the pref-U erence advantage that X enjoys over Y. The step function in figure 1 is . It crosses the axis at n, the long vertical segment is at m, and the U i triangular area enclosed between [m, n] and the step function is . U Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium in the campaign promises game. In any equilibrium Y wins if and only if .
The idea behind proposition 1 is easily explained. Party Y must spend at least in order to secure a majority. If the two parties were to compete, U they would compete over the minimum-cost voters. The competition 
Now, Y quits since to regain the majority it would have to increase its commitment to voter 2 to at least 5, which exceeds . It is easy to see 
As the example shows, there are many equilibria in this game because 5 Note that this characterization is easily extended to any voting rule, including ones that might be nonanonymous and/or nonneutral, and might include weights, veto players, or other special considerations. The critical calculation is the minimum expenditure that Y has to incur in order to secure a winning vote, and so one can calculate a corresponding for any voting rule. U the loser's behavior is not pinned down, since it is certain to lose and will not have to honor the promises it makes. Note, however, that strategies that prescribe quitting below, or bidding above, one's value make sense only if one is certain of the other party's value and behavior. Hence we introduce uncertainty over the parties' values and consider a refinement that selects what seems to be the natural outcome. The outcome on which we focus arises when parties use least-expensive majority (LEM) strategies, in which each party purchases the least-expensive majority in turn, provided that their total commitment does not exceed their value (the second equilibrium in the example has this form). The identity of the winner would still be the same as above, but the total payment of the winner would be the loser's value adjusted by the magnitude , as spelled out in the proposition. Moreover, as dis-U cussed after proposition 2, in this case we can narrow down the subset of voters who might receive payments. Specifically, if realized party preferences are as in example 1, then this pins down the equilibrium to the one described in which only voter 2 receives offers, and offers to voter 2 increase one step at time until X wins with an offer of 2.
The refinement we consider is "ex post perfect equilibrium." A strategy for player k in this game of incomplete information specifies for each possible realization of type ( ) for player k what that type will k W do after any sequence of offers. A pair of such strategies is an ex post perfect equilibrium if the strategies would constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium when each player is told the realization of the opponent's type, and this has to hold for all possible realizations of the opponent's type. 6 Given our use of subgame perfection in the complete-information game, this seems to be a natural refinement for the incomplete-information game. While it is clear that such equilibria might not always exist in general environments, they are very robust and compelling equilibria when they do exist, which they do in our setting.
The values of each party are distributed on a finite set W. The difference between any two adjacent values in W is no more than , and W does not include integer multiples of .
Proposition 2. Consider the campaign promises game with any full-support distribution over W: 1. LEM strategies constitute an ex post perfect equilibrium. 6 We believe that the result holds under much weaker assumptions (i.e., for more general solution concepts) but have not been able to prove such a conjecture. We have been able to show that the result also holds if we instead use an ex post Nash equilibrium in which players do not use weakly dominated strategies. That is neither a stronger nor a weaker solution than ex post perfect equilibrium. We know that it is false under the weaker refinements of excluding only weakly dominated strategies or considering only sequential equilibrium. 
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payments. Thus, in ex post perfect equilibria, the loser promises an amount equal to its value to a subset of the "near-median" voters (those between , the first voter with the median preferences, and , the last voterm n whose preference for Y is marginal, i.e., less than ). The winner commits-also to voters in this group-the minimal sum required to beat the loser. This sum amounts to the value of the loser plus or minus the magnitude according to whether the winner is X or Y.
7
U While payments are concentrated among the voters between and m , the particulars of which voters get how much can differ across equin libria. For example, in one equilibrium using LEM strategies in a case in which , the final outcome is that party X ends up offering 
This happens by having the parties repeatedly outbid each other by a minimal amount for voter m. In another equilibrium with LEM strategies, X's budget is spread equally over voters , and Y matches i [m, n] all those bids and tops them off by to compensate for these voters'
One of the main objectives of this paper is to compare the equilibrium under campaign promises as described by proposition 2 with the equilibrium under up-front vote buying to be derived below. But the analysis of the present section also serves to complement the literature on campaign promises. Myerson (1993) considered a simultaneous move model of redistributive promises assuming symmetry among voters and between parties. The model above allows heterogeneity in the preferences of the parties and the voters and uses this heterogeneity to identify the winner, the magnitude of the promises, and the identity of the voters who benefit from them. As discussed further in Section V.F, the richer insights are made possible by the assumptions that the parties' promises are made sequentially and cannot be withdrawn. (This enables us to circumvent the technical difficulties encountered by Myerson and the earlier literature on "Colonel Blotto" games.)
Finally, notice that if there were only one voter, the campaign promises game would be an English auction in which the seller has a known 7 
If
, then any strategy by Y that involves promises amounting to less than is Y Y W ! U W a LEM strategy, and no payments are made, although Y might still make promises. preference for one buyer over the other. With many voters, this analogy is not exact, but the model and analysis still resemble those of the English auction, where there is competition over the "marginal" voters (the least-expensive voters whom the party that would lose in the absence of promises would have to obtain in order to win the election). The equilibrium in LEM strategies is the counterpart of the standard equilibrium in undominated strategies of the English auction.
IV. Up-Front Vote Buying
We now consider the situation in which up-front vote buying is permitted. In this game each firm in its turn offers a price that constitutes k p a commitment to buy up to m votes at this price. Again, voters are not formally modeled as players in this game. Instead, it is assumed that, once the bidding ends, all voters try first to tender their votes to the highest bidder and those who are rationed by the winner tender their votes to the loser. Thus, if at the end of the bidding, X ends up 
This is somewhat artificial. Besides assuming that the parties' offers are commitments that can only be increased-assumptions that are shared with the campaign promises model-the up-front buying model embodies a number of additional assumptions. First, the voters try to sell at the higher price, ignoring their potential of being pivotal. Second, the parties make the same restricted offers to all voters. Third, voters wait to the end of the bidding process before tendering their votes.
The main purpose of adopting this model is to simplify the analysis. Consider first the decision to assume away pivot considerations. Since and are the utility that i obtains from a victory of X and Y,
respectively, then a strategic voter i would compare
and try to sell to X if (1a) is larger than (1b). Note that the probability If this probability is negligible, then the comparison between (1a) and (1b) reduces to a comparison between and . Thus, the assumption X Y p p that voters try to sell to the highest bidder is a simple way of encapsulating the assumption that endogenous pivot probabilities do not play an important role in the situations we would like to consider. We explain this further in Section V.C by arguing that in a more complete model, pivot considerations are inconsequential in this setting even when voters are fully strategic.
Proposition 3. In the uniform-offer up-front vote-buying game, if , , party j wins in (every) equilibrium and j's
Proposition 3 says that, modulo some 's, the party with the higher value wins and makes negligible payments to voters. In contrast, when the competition between the parties is restricted to campaign promises, the voters' preferences have a direct effect on the outcome and some near-median voters might get substantial transfers. In a sense this confirms a popular view that vote buying would give more power to the vote buyers and not benefit the voters in comparison with competition via campaign promises.
The proposition is illustrated in the following example. will tender to Y and two of them will be selected. If X attempts to bid, then Y will be willing to increase the bid up to 2, whereas X will not be willing to follow. Anticipating this, X will not bid (since it will be forced to buy from one voter despite losing).
The assumption that the parties make uniform restricted-price offers is not made in our companion paper (Dekel et al. 2006b ), whereamong other differences in the modeling-the parties make direct offers to individuals rather than announce a uniform price. In that model the assumption that voters wait for the end is more compelling since it is weakly dominant for them to do so. The alternative model yields the same insights as the present one but is more complex to analyze and requires adding a (negligible) bidding cost per period. If we incorporated such a cost throughout this paper, it would complicate the results of the campaign promises model. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that such a model (with the bidding costs) would yield the same conclusion as below.
Notice that the up-front buying model is closely related to an all-pay auction: any outstanding promises must be paid regardless of whether a party ends up winning. It is not exactly an all-pay auction since the winner pays m times the last price it offered and the loser pays m Ϫ 1 times the last price it offered. In contrast, campaign promises are not binding unless a candidate wins, and hence the interaction there resembles an English auction instead of an all-pay auction. Thus, when the parties compete through up-front buying, it is not worthwhile for a party to make substantial offers if it is unlikely to win; but when the competition occurs through campaign promises, it is worthwhile to bid even when the probability of winning is small.
Up-front buying with incomplete information about parties' values.-In the campaign promises game we identified a subset of equilibrium strategies that were robust. Here we show that the equilibrium outcome of proposition 3 is robust to the introduction of some (small) uncertainty about the values. To see this consider the up-front buying game under the assumption that the parties are uncertain about the valuations of the other party. That is, is now private information of party k. We show k W that, when there is sufficiently "little" incomplete information, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) outcome that is close to the complete-information outcome. , and that
then there is a PBE in which players use only undominated h ! h(d) strategies with an outcome that coincides with the complete-information outcome (i.e., Y wins paying no more than m) with a probability of at least d.
We believe that this equilibrium is not unique. Since we are interested in robustness rather than finding additional equilibria that disappear when there is complete information, we have not verified this conjecture. 9 8 The equilibrium we construct is not an ex post perfect equilibrium. In the games with up-front vote buying, parties prefer not to make any payments if they lose, which leads to different strategic properties than in the campaign promises case in which losers never have to make any payments.
9 In a single-unit all-pay auction with jump bids, Dekel et al. (2006a) construct an equilibrium in which the voters receive, on average, significant positive payments (not only on the order of ) and the losing bidder may pay significant amounts. Although that model is essentially the single-voter special case of the present model, the extension to and some small differences in the specification do not allow us to just assert that N 1 3 such an equilibrium exists in the present model as well. However, it seems very likely that such an equilibrium exists here as well. 
A. Insights
The main insights of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, with campaign promises, the party with the highest value, adjusted by the voters' preferences measure , wins and pays out the second-highest U value, subject to the same adjustment, to a group of near-median voters. Second, with up-front vote buying and no uncertainty, there will be only minimal spending in equilibrium. Third, our analysis highlights some important differences between competition through up-front vote buying and through campaign promises, both in terms of the expected cost of winning and in the determination of the winner. The outcome of competition in campaign promises is affected by the preferences of the voters and might involve substantial transfers to the voters, whereas the outcome of up-front vote buying is not affected by the voters' preferences and the voters receive only minimal transfers.
10
As mentioned in the introduction, all these features are broadly consistent with descriptive work on vote buying. Anderson and Tollison (1990) claim that during a period in which vote buying was common, the payments were small, and the elimination of vote buying led to an increase in social policies. Low payments in up-front vote buying also seem consistent with the observation that the price of stocks with voting rights is generally similar to that of nonvoting stocks (Lamont and Thaler 2003) , and hence the additional payment that is solely for voting rights is minimal, as in our model.
B. Efficiency
We ask now how vote buying affects welfare, where welfare is measured by the sum of voters' values plus the vote buyers' values. We identify efficiency with maximization of this welfare measure. In the absence of any mechanism for buying and selling votes, the outcome of voting will in general be inefficient. There is simply nothing to make voters take into account the effect of their vote on others. A natural hypothesis then might be that the opening of trade will lead to efficient outcomes. Our analysis shows that the outcome of a vote-buying equilibrium is in general inefficient. In the up-front buying scenario, only the parties' valuations matter: If voters strongly support X but is larger than Y W , Y still wins. In the campaign promise scenario, only the preferences X W 10 These relatively sharp insights are facilitated by modeling assumptions that have been discussed in the paper, including the sequential bidding with offers that cannot be withdrawn and the (almost) complete information with regard to the parties' valuations. of voters near the median group affect the outcome, and hence, the outcome does not reflect the preferences of all voters.
Under what circumstances will vote buying result in efficiency? In the up-front vote-buying game, the equilibrium will be (approximately) efficient if the parties' valuations are proportional to the true surpluses, that is, if stands in the same proportion to as is in pro-
. This would be the case if the party's valuation per-
fectly aggregated the values of its supporters.
11
More fundamentally, the main source of inefficiency is that the voters are not pivotal with respect to the decision. 12 A nonpivotal voter will sell her vote regardless of how she values the parties. Hence, it is clear that vote buying cannot take such a person's preferences into account and thus would not be efficient.
13
Do vote buying and selling entail greater welfare loss than would occur in their absence? It is easy to construct examples that generate higher or lower overall utility with vote buying than with campaign promises or with neither. What we learn from our model is that vote buying may lead to parties' valuations rather than voter preferences being the driving force that determines the winner. Thus, if we think of a party's valuation as reflecting the profit that a certain narrow group will derive from taking over the government, then the opening of vote trading will elevate the relative importance of such groups, but of course nothing can be said in general on whether these biases are likely to produce lower total utility than simple voting.
While it is natural to ask how vote buying and campaign promises fare in terms of efficiency, our goal was not to find a mechanism that yields efficiency. That mechanism design question is trivial in the context studied here, where the parties have complete information. Rather we wanted to take the voting as given and explore the implications of permitting trade.
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C. Voter Behavior
Assuming, in the up-front buying model, that voters sell to the party that offers the higher is a shortcut that embodies the assumption that k p pivot probabilities play a negligible role. If the voters were modeled as players, who at the end of the bidding decide simultaneously to which party to tender, then the behavior that we have assumed-that everybody tries first to tender to the party that offers the higher price-will still be an equilibrium behavior in the tendering subgame. But there might also be other equilibria that rely on pivot considerations. For example, there might be an equilibrium in the tendering subgame in which exactly voters tender to party X although , since for each
. We think that pivot considerations of this
sort are not truly important in the situations we would like to consider. In large elections there is inevitably sufficient noise to make the pivot probability of an individual voter insignificant. This can be modeled formally by introducing some "noise voters" into the model. The magnitude of such noise can be made small relative to the size of the electorate, hence leaving intact the essence of the analysis conducted above. At the same time, the noise can be significant enough to make the pivot probabilities negligible.
14 To see this formally, suppose that there is an odd number N of strategic voters and an even number L of noise voters each of whom tenders her vote randomly and independently with equal probability to each of the parties. Consider now the up-front buying of Section IV. The minimal majority required now for winning is . Each of the N stra-(N ϩ L ϩ 1)/2 tegic voters tenders to X if
Consider now a tendering subgame that takes place after the bidding stops with prices . If there is an equilibrium in which some voters X Y p ! p tender to X with positive probability, in this equilibrium it must be that
14 See Dal Bo (2007) for alternative arguments behind why pivot considerations are not an issue.
Now
Pr (X winsFi tenders to X ) Ϫ Pr (X winsFi tenders to Y )
The last inequality follows from the fact that maximizes
and the fact that the probabilities Pr (exactly [(N ϩ L Ϫ 1)/2] Ϫ k sum up to less than one. strategic voters tender to X ) Since as , there is such that, for all ,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that . But (2) is violated. Therefore, for , there is no equi-L ≥ L librium in which strategic voters tender to the lower price. Now, if N is large, the fraction of noise voters to strategic ones can be negligible, yet pivot considerations never affect the considerations of the strategic voters. The analysis of the parties' bidding competition will remain exactly the same as in Section IV.
The bottom line is that we think that, for the purposes of our analysis, it is appropriate to abstract away from pivot considerations. We chose to do so in a straightforward way. As the preceding paragraph explains, this can be done in a more sophisticated way. However, if we were to adopt such an approach and carry it throughout, the complexity of the analysis would increase substantially without any gain in substance.
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D. Budgets
Throughout the above analysis the parties were not subjected to budget constraints. We argue below that our main results have immediate analogues in the case in which the parties are constrained by budgets. Suppose that the parties have budgets and , respectively. The con- B ≥ B ϩU payments end up as in proposition 2 and only the voters in the interval ever receive promises in equilibrium. In the case of up-front [m, n] buying, the analogues of propositions 3 and 4 again hold, with budgets replacing the valuations for winning, and thus the party with the larger budget (modulo some 's) wins with a negligible total payment. The proofs of these results are simpler than their counterparts without budget constraints, since the budget constraints together with the grid bound the depth of the game tree.
Notice, however, that if we introduce budget constraints, the meaning of the comparison between campaign promises and up-front buying is less clear than it was when the focus was on valuations alone as it was throughout the analysis. The reason is that it is not obvious that the same budget constraints should apply to these two scenarios, whereas it is natural to assume that parties' valuations are independent of the mode of competition.
E. The Nature of Political Competition and Redistribution
Our Model of Political Competition
When we refer to the "utility of a party,"
, we mean the benefits k W accruing to a narrow group of individuals who control it. 15 The utility aggregates the intangible benefit of being in power and the value k W of resources that party k obtains from being in power. 15 In our analysis we do not model these individuals as voters. Including them explicitly as voters would have no effect on the up-front vote-buying analysis. In the case of campaign promises, if the insiders are those whose intangible utility is greater than the utility any voter gets from their winning (i.e., it is greater than for X party members and greater The basic premise is that the winner is a residual claimant to the government resources that have not been committed. This does not mean that the government can do anything it wishes. It is reasonable to assume that the government is constrained (by law, custom, or fear of rebellion) to levy no more than a benchmark level of taxes and to provide no less than a benchmark level of benefits. The maximum sum that the party in power can capture is the difference between the maximal tax revenue it can collect and the cost of the provision of the mandated benefits. This, combined with the intangible benefit, makes up . 16 The payoff of the winner is minus the value of the comk k W W mitments and payments made during the contest. The commitments made in the campaign promises scenario can then be viewed as reductions of the maximal tax and/or enhancements of the minimum benefits that are targeted at given voters. In the up-front payments scenario, voters may get transfers before the election, but the benchmark levels of taxes and benefits are not changed by the competition. The fact that the benchmark levels of taxes and benefits were not included explicitly in the formal model was just a normalization of both to zero. Nothing would change if we introduced nonzero benchmark levels into the model.
17
This modeling approach, that casts the winner as a residual claimant, enables the direct comparison between the up-front purchase of votes and campaign promises: whether the payments are made up-front or later from the government resources, they are paid out of the same source, namely out of the government resources that the winning party extracts.
An Alternative View of Political Competition
Under an alternative view, government resources cannot be appropriated by the winner. The winner may derive some utility from being in power, but it can only redistribute the government resources among the voters. This view is embodied, for example, in Myerson's (1993) model. Our model can be modified as follows to consider this view. Let k B denote the government budget that will be available for distribution if party wins. The budgets may differ across the parties as a k k p X, Y B result of different abilities to manage the government or different fun- 16 Like the intangible benefits, the value of being a residual claimant may vary across the parties, e.g., owing to different managerial abilities, which translate to different costs. 17 Notice, however, that the campaign promises model cannot be simply extended to allow the parties to commit to new taxes in each round along with their other promises, since the possibility of offsetting promises by taxes would violate the assumption that the parties' promises cannot be withdrawn. Given our monotonicity constraints on offers, taxes could be incorporated as described above, with a benchmark tax level that will be levied on any voter (to the extent that it is not reduced by campaign promises). p c i paign promises case) and the rules for its termination remain the same as before. Note that under this view a promise made to one voter comes indirectly at the expense of other voters, whereas in the previous view, a promise to a voter comes at the expense of the winner by virtue of its being the residual claimant.
The analysis of the up-front vote buying case remains exactly the same. Regardless of how voters expect the parties to distribute the government budget upon winning, the tendering decisions are still based only on the up-front prices . Therefore, the winner is still the party with the 
The outcome of the competition depends on the expectations regarding the distribution of the uncommitted resources, as embodied in the 's, k a i and this is also the main difference between this model and the model we analyzed throughout.
If these uncommitted resources are expected to be distributed to a narrow group of close affiliates, say and otherwise,
then the model is essentially the model used throughout the paper, as was discussed in the preceding subsection. In this case the party and its close affiliates are again the residual claimants to the government resources, and the analysis with is essentially as in Section V.D on budgetk B constrained parties.
19
18 In contrast to the preceding discussion of budgets, now the budget is derived solely from government revenue. The source of revenue was irrelevant to the preceding discussion, and it maintained our perspective of parties that profit directly from any surpluses. 19 Assuming that party insiders are as described in the last paragraph of Sec. V.E.1.
If, alternatively, these uncommitted resources are expected to be distributed more evenly, say for all i and k, then the situation is bidding stops at that point, Y will continue to have the advantage in the subgame in which they can just spend these uncommitted resources. It then follows from the analysis of Section III that by using a LEM strategy Y can guarantee a profitable win.
Which Is the Correct View?
Both views are somewhat extreme. It is difficult to think of examples of regimes in which the people in charge act completely as residual claimants to the government resources. It is similarly difficult to think of regimes that do not appropriate some government resources to benefit narrow groups of affiliates. Realistic situations combine both elements. As can be inferred from the discussion just above, our model can be modified to deal with such intermediate situations without changing much of the analysis or results.
F. Related Literature
We discuss below three literatures that dealt with vote buying and relate them to our analysis.
Colonel Blotto Games
In a "Colonel Blotto game," two opposing armies simultaneously allocate forces among n fronts. Any given front is won by the army that committed a larger force to that front, and the overall winner is the army that wins a majority of the fronts. This model has been also interpreted as a model of electoral competition, where each party wins the voters to whom it made the larger promise and the overall winner of the election is the party that managed to win a majority of the votes (Gross and Wagner's [1950] continuous version of a Colonel Blotto game is perhaps the earliest contribution adopting this interpretation). A simultaneous version of our campaign promises game with budget con-Friday Mar 07 2008 11:56 AM JPE v116n2 32396 VML straints (as explained earlier in this section) is also a Colonel Blotto game. The problem is that Colonel Blotto games are notoriously difficult to solve, even in the simplest settings. 20 The existing analyses are of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in which voters are treated identically (from an ex ante point of view) and the parties are equally likely to win. Myerson (1993) circumvents some of the technical difficulties of Colonel Blotto games by allowing candidates to meet the budget constraint on average rather than exactly. In particular, Myerson considers a simultaneous move game that is similar to the campaign promises game we analyze, but in which parties can offer random payments to each voter and the payments need only meet the budget in expectation. As in the previous Colonel Blotto literature, Myerson assumes that voters and parties are symmetric and derives a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which parties exhaust their budgets.
Our work circumvents the technical difficulties of this literature by making the bidding sequential and irreversible (past promises cannot be withdrawn or lowered). While the irreversibility may not always apply, these features permit a rich analysis. This enables us to consider heterogeneous voters and parties and examine how such heterogeneity affects the outcomes.
2. Other Vote-Buying Models Groseclose and Snyder (1996) present a model of vote buying in a legislature. Their model can be thought of as a two-round version of our campaign promises or our alternative up-front vote-buying model.
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The restriction to two rounds gives the second mover a substantial advantage. The first mover has to purchase a supermajority of voters in order to successfully block the response of the second mover. Thus, for example, if all voters were indifferent between the parties, the first mover would need to make promises totaling twice the value (or budget) of the second mover in order to win, since the second mover should not be able to purchase the least-expensive 50 percent. As is evident from the above analysis, our more symmetric bidding process neutralizes the effect of the order of moves and consequently gets significantly different results with respect to the identity of the winner, how much it pays, which voters it buys, and the mode of competition (up-front vote buying or campaign promises).
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Another feature of vote buying in legislative settings that differs from that of general elections is that legislators may care (substantially) about how they cast their vote independent of the outcome. In a companion paper (Dekel et al. 2006b ), we analyze alternating-move vote-buying games similar to the ones analyzed here, but in contexts in which voters care about how they cast their vote and not just about the eventual outcome. For instance, a legislator might strongly prefer to vote against a certain bill even if the bill is sure to pass, given that his or her constituents might pay attention to the legislator's voting record in future campaigns. This changes the behavior of legislators (voters) significantly vis-à-vis the analysis in this paper and hence also has a substantial impact on the strategic interaction of the vote buyers. For instance, the upfront vote-buying game with complete information can involve substantial payments by the winner, and the identity of the winner depends in a subtle way on both the buyer's willingness to pay and the voters' preferences. That contrasts sharply with the analysis of general elections in this paper. The companion paper also has a different focus: it studies the impact of budget constraints on vote buyers. We refer the interested reader to the companion paper for more details.
Corporate Control
The related literature on corporate control (Grossman and Hart 1988; Harris and Raviv 1988) examines settings in which two alternative management teams-an incumbent and a rival-are competing to gain control of a corporation through acquisition of a majority of the shareholders' votes. The alternative teams are the counterparts of our parties, and their private benefits from controlling the corporation are the counterparts of the parties' valuations for being elected. The shareholders are the counterparts of our voters with a special form of identical preferences based on the difference in share value that will be generated under the two teams. The model of Harris and Raviv 23 resembles a tworound version of our up-front restricted price offers model. Harris and Raviv characterize an equilibrium in which the efficient team wins, that is, the team that maximizes the total shareholder value plus its private 22 Other articles that address similar issues are sufficiently distant in terms of their focus and framework to be considered largely complementary to our discussion, and it does not seem useful to try to relate them to our analysis. These include Buchanan and Tullock (1962) , Tobin (1970) , Philipson and Snyder (1996) , Kochin and Kochin (1998) , and Baron (2006) . 23 The related model of Grossman and Hart does not seem to have an explicit equilibrium model for the case that would be close to our model (what they call competition in restricted offers between parties with significant private benefits).
ises that exceed their values. Since there is not a unique winner, there must be a last node where some player mixes along the equilibrium path and is the winner along one path that follows and the loser along another path. Since a player's value is different from any level of payments that he could promise, the path that leads the player to be the winner must result in either a strictly positive or a strictly negative payoff; exiting results in a zero payoff. This cannot be since the player will strictly prefer one of these pure outcomes. Next, note that in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, no player will follow a strategy in which he ends up paying more than his value. Thus, by parts 1c and 2c and by focusing on the initial node in which , Y can guarantee a win if , and X kl Y X C p 0 W ≥ W ϩU can guarantee a win otherwise. Thus, given that the equilibrium is such that all equilibrium paths lead to the same winner, the proposition must hold, since then the player who has a strategy that guarantees a win against any subgameperfect equilibrium strategy of the other must have a positive utility and be the winner. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1 follows from lemma 2. Part 2 follows from the definition of ex post perfect equilibrium and proposition 1.
Part 3: Assume to the contrary that in some ex post perfect equilibrium Y wins and with some probability promises less than , say . Consider c ϪU 1 U Ϫ U to obtain a majority after Y offered c.
To understand this, note that an offer by Y can attain two objectives: achieving a majority and increasing the amount that X will subsequently need to offer U in order to obtain a majority. An offer is wasteful if it is greater than the minimal
